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Critiques of standard one-dimensional development indices are gaining momentum. The 
Human Development Index and the Human Development Index Adjusted for Inequality 
are two of the most well known multidimensional alternative indices. However, questions 
arise regarding their usefulness for policy analysis at a macro development level. In this 
paper, I analyze those questions from the perspective of an applied development 
policymaker who tries to perform exercises in intertemporal policy analysis. In Sections 1 
and 2 I discuss the standard and human development indices of development and 
inequality. In Section 3 I present the standard goals, models and tools used in applied 
macro development policy analysis and I analyze some possible extensions toward the 
Human Development approach. Finally, in Section 4 I discuss some other issues that the 
Human Development approach should address to compete for a relevant role in the 
applied development policymaker toolbox.  
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1. One and multidimensional development indices 
 
For a long time it has been usual to measure the level of development of a country using 
as an index per capita income or per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This way of 
measuring development has been criticized, with increasing emphasis, as narrow and one-
dimensional (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2008).  
 
Critiques may be grouped into two broad categories: empirical and theoretical. Empirical 
critiques point towards everything that GDP does not adequately measure due to 
shortcomings in the collection or processing of information. For example, environmental 
pollution externalities, some public goods, or non-market activities such as domestic work 
are conventionally not counted as part of GDP. Theoretical critiques point to inadequacies 
of GDP or income as an appropriate concept of welfare. These critiques may be further 
divided into two types: simplistic and sophisticated. 
 
Simplistic criticism could be assimilated to the popular adage that "money can’t buy 
happiness". It points towards the insufficiency of what is sometimes termed as a narrowly 
economic view of welfare. This criticism usually takes into consideration a restricted view 
of the concepts of commodity and price, understanding the first one as a set of “material 
goods” and the second one as “monetary prices”. Certainly, in very general terms GDP is, 
for a given year, equal to the sum of the product of each good and service (each 
commodity  ) multiplied by its current price  : 
 
 
1.1                                                                         
 
    
 
However, standard economic theory used to defend the concept of GDP as an adequate 
measure of welfare, works with wider concepts of commodities and prices. Roughly 
speaking, for this theory the level of income or product of a person or country is a 
measure of purchasing power, the quantity of the various goods and services potentially 
accessible with that income. Obviously, the conversion of income into a range of goods 
and services is mediated by their prices. And prices depend on supply and demand, which 
are in time determined by technology, assets and preferences, that is, “what people 
value” and the “economic decisions” they make accordingly.  
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What should be noticed at this point is that standard economic theory uses very broad 
concepts of goods and services and economic decisions, including within them not only 
the decisions people make about goods such as food or clothing, or services such as 
haircuts or banking accounts, but also decisions about education (Schultz, 1963), health 
(Fuchs, 1998), marriage and family (Becker, 1981), personal identity (Akerloff and Kranton, 
2010), and other decisions covering a wide range of human behavior. Thus, from this point 
of view and beyond measurement imperfections, a country’s GDP could in principle fully 
reflect its level of well-being, since it would encompass the results of the choices made by 
its people given the constraints they face. 
 
But if this is indeed so, what would be the problem of identifying development and 
welfare with income or GDP? One of the most sophisticated critiques about it is provided 
by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen. For Sen, the important thing is not only the goods and 
services that a person has or may have, but what a person does or can do, is or may be 
(Sen, 1989). In Sen's terminology, what is important is the conversion of goods and 
services in personal achievements or "functionings". For example, two people with the 
same income level, and therefore the same opportunities of access to food, can achieve 
different functionings depending on their metabolism, body size, age, sex, activity level, 
health, access to medical services and ability to use them, nutritional knowledge and 
education, and weather conditions. Moreover, functionings are conditioned by the 
“capabilities” of a person, understood as the freedom she has to choose between 
functionings. The larger the capabilities set, the larger the universe of possible 
functionings. It goes without saying then that if a person has a high level of income, this 
will enable her to have a high command over resources, that is, to access more goods and 
services. But will be the set of capabilities available to such person the one which 
determines her possible functionings, i.e. the transformation of those goods and services 
in welfare. From this perspective, then, the fundamental goal of development, beyond the 
expansion of income or GDP, should be the expansion of people’s capabilities. 
 
The most influential practical way to make this approach operational has been to consider 
three basic dimensions of human development, namely: to enjoy a long and healthy life, 
to acquire knowledge and be creative, and to have a decent standard of living thanks to 
access to material resources (Anand and Sen, 2000). While the first two dimensions refer 
directly to people’s capabilities, the third refers to their command over resources. Indices 
of health, education and income are built as empirical approaches to the measurement of 
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each dimension. For the health dimension, an index         based on life expectancy at 
birth; for education, an index              based on average years of education and 
expected years of education; and for living standards, an index           based on the 
national income per capita. The Human Development Index (HDI) is computed as the 
geometric mean of the indices for each of the dimensions. 
 
 
1.2                                          
                  
              
     
 
 
By construction, the HDI can take values between 0 and 1. The closer the index is to 1, the 
higher the level of human development. The HDI is computed annually by the UNDP for 
almost every country in the world.1 
 
There are other multidimensional indices related to overall development or to some 
aggregate aspects of it.  However, most of them are ad-hoc indices.2 The HDI is 
particularly interesting since it is considered by many as theoretically grounded in 
Amartya Sen’s capabilities theory.    
 
  
2. One and multidimensional inequality indices 
 
As GDP is commonly used as a one-dimensional measure of development, the Gini 
coefficient is commonly used as a one-dimensional measure of inequality, most of the 
time understood narrowly as inequality in income distribution. The Gini coefficient    
measures inequality among the values of a frequency distribution, and is computed as:  
 
 
2.1                                                                    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 For details about these indices, which also imply normalization procedures imposing maximum and 
minimum values, see the Technical Notes in UNDP (2010). 
 
2
 Ravallion (2010a) presents a critical review of some of those indices, including the HDI.  
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where      is a Lorenz curve, that is, a function where   represents the cumulative 
portion of the population and where      represents the cumulative portion of income. A 
Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality, where all values are the same 
(everybody has the same income). A Gini coefficient of inequality equal to one expresses 
maximal values (only one person has all the income).3  
 
Criticism of the one-dimensionality of GDP as an index of development has also been 
extended to the one-dimensionality of the Gini coefficient as inequality index. And like the 
Human Development Index has become the most influential multidimensional index of 
development, the recently introduced Inequality adjusted Human Development Index 
(IHDI) would be called to follow the same path, as an attempt to make operational the 
concept of equality of capabilities developed by Amartya Sen (Sen, 1979). 
 
To compute the IHDI, an index adjusted for inequality     is first computed for each 
dimension   of human development (Life, Education, Income): 
 
 
2.2                                                                         
 
where      is the standard index for the   dimension, where     is an Atkinson inequality 
measure (Atkinson, 1970): 
 
2.3                                                          
        
 
  
 
 
and where         is the underlying distribution of the dimension. Finally, the IHDI is 
obtained as: 
 
2.4                                            
                    
                
    
 
By construction, the IHDI is very sensitive to low values, in a somewhat "Rawlsian" way: 
the larger the inequality, the larger the reduction in human development, and in more 
                                                          
3
 However, a value greater than one may occur if some persons have negative income or wealth. 
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than proportional terms. Comparing the value of the IHDI against the value of the HDI for 
a given country, we obtain the "reduction in human development" due to inequality.4 
 
The graph below displays, in the horizontal axes, the level of human development, and in 
the vertical axes, the reduction in that level due to inequality for the Argentine provinces.5 
There is a clear inverse correlation between human development and inequality.6  
 
Human Development and Inequality 
Argentine Provinces, 2009
 
                               Source: PNUD Argentina (2010) 
                                                          
4
 In general terms, that index can be seen as a particular case of the “general mean of general means” 
proposed by Foster, Lopez-Calva and Szekely (2003), with inequality aversion parameter equal to one. For a 
table with GNP, Gini Coefficients, HDI and IHDI for most countries in the world, see UNDP (2010). 
 
5
 The first empirical application of the IHDI at a sub-national level was made in Mexico and reported in PNUD 
Mexico (2004), followed by the empirical application, also at a sub-national level, made in Argentina and 
reported in PNUD Argentina (2009). Starting in 2010, the Human Development Report began to report the 
IHDI at national level for most countries in the world. Due to differences in available data sources at the 
national and sub-national levels, the corresponding indices are not comparable.   
 
6
 However, correlation is not causation and the true causality, or the feedback mechanisms, between human 
development and inequality is something to be determined. Strictly speaking, interpreting the percentage 
reduction obtained by comparing the HDI against IHDI as a reduction “due” to inequality, or as the potential 
increase that would obtain in human development if inequality was eliminated, may be misleading.  
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Facing the Graph above, a benevolent development policymaker would try to reduce 
regional inequality in human development, for instance, by means of the redistribution of 
fiscal resources. To take a first step towards the complexity of this challenge, let’s assume 
that the policymaker’s country has only three Provinces (A, B and C), each of them with 
two Regions (1 and 2). Hypothetical initial conditions in terms of human development are 
shown in the Table below, where Province A displays high levels of human development 
indices of income, health and education; Province B medium levels, and Province C low 
levels. The Base Case column shows the IHDI corresponding to the values of the income, 
education and health indices shown in the Table.   
 
 
 
 
 
Assume now that, in a first policy experiment, health fiscal expenditure is redistributed 
from the highest human development regions to the lowest human development region, 
so that the health index in Regions A1 and A2 is reduced by 0.15 units (going from 0.75 to 
0.6 in each region) while the health index in Region C2 is increased by 0.30 units (going 
from 0.1 to 0.4).7 Remember that an increase in the IHDI is an improvement in welfare. 
We can see that the IHDI in Province A falls from 0.75 in the Base Case column to 0.7 in 
the Policy 1 column. This is due to the loss of health, and also due to the increase in 
inequality because of the imbalance that is now evident between health on the one hand, 
and income and education on the other hand. At the same time, the IHDI in Province C 
increases from 0.215 in the Base Case column to 0.270 in the Policy 1 column. This is due 
                                                          
7
 The underlying assumption here is that there is a perfect correlation between units of fiscal expenditure 
and health, education or income indices units.  
Income Education Health IHDI IHDI IHDI
Index Index Index Base Case Policy 1 Policy 2
Province A Region A1 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,70 0,70
Region A2 0,75 0,75 0,75
Province B Region B1 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,50 0,50 0,50
Region B2 0,5 0,5 0,5
Province C Region C1 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,215 0,270 0,274
Region C2 0,25 0,25 0,1
Country 0,43 0,45 0,46
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to the gain in health, to the decrease in inequality between Region C1 and Region C2, and 
to the reduction in the imbalance between health, education and income in Region C2. 
Notice also that the country IHDI increases from 0.43 in the Base Case column to 0.45 in 
the Policy 1 column, showing that the “redistribution of health” from the richest to the 
poorest is not neutral for the IHDI.  
 
Assume now that in a second policy experiment, the health index in Regions A1 and A2 is 
reduced in the same way as in the first experiment (that is, by 0.30 units), while the health 
index in Region C2 is increased by 0.2 units only, and the education and income indices in 
the same region are increased by 0.05 units each. We can see in the Policy 2 column that 
the IHDI in Province C increases even further to 0.274 while the country IHDI increases to 
0.46. Thus, an application of the resources transferred to Region C2 so that the region 
profile in terms of health, education and income is more balanced, improves the IHDI. 
 
Policy exercises with multidimensional indices like the ones performed above could be 
taken as reference by policymakers at the national level, or by provincial governments in a 
federal system, to discuss alternative fiscal redistribution schemes to improve human 
development. However, these exercises rely on very strong assumptions. Indeed, they 
assume that the human development dimensions (income, education and health), as well 
as regions and provinces, behave in a relatively independent way, with low or no feedback 
mechanisms among them. This is the risk we ran into when we play with multidimensional 
indices of development as if they were models of development processes. But they are 
not.  
 
So far I have presented the main features of the most influential indices of development 
and inequality: GDP, the Gini coefficient, the HDI and the IHDI. As such, they are purely 
descriptive of the main results or goals of development. The situation becomes more 
complex when we try to move from results, or policy goals, to the dynamic structural 
processes that constraint their achievement, and to the appropriate use of the policy 
instruments necessary to reach those goals. 
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3. Applied development policy analysis 
 
Assume now that the target for a benevolent applied development policymaker is to 
maximize the welfare of her country, understanding this as the maximization of 
“development” and the minimization of “inequality”. For a “standard policymaker”, the 
main policy goal would be the maximization of per capita GDP (or, more or less 
equivalently, of per capita income or consumption) and the minimization of income, 
consumption or assets inequality. While for a “human development policymaker”, the 
main policy goal would be the maximization8 of the capabilities of individuals and the 
minimization of the inequality in their distribution among them.9  
 
 
3.1 The standard approach 
 
From the standard viewpoint, development and growth are many times taken as 
synonyms, and today’s canonical form of structurally analyzing and modeling growth 
processes is by means of Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans type models (Acemoglu, 2008; Barro 
and Xala-i-Martin, 2003). In these models, a benevolent policymaker is supposed to 
maximize an intertemporal welfare function subject, as a constraint, to an aggregate 
representation of the structural dynamics of the economy given by a production function, 
a balance equation, a set of capital accumulation equations, and suitable initial and 
transversality conditions. An example of this kind of models, useful for our discussion 
since it includes not only physical capital but also two specific forms of human capital 
(health and educational capital), is the following one (Barro, 1996):10  
 
3.1                                          Max               
 
 
      subject to: 
                                                          
8
  As we will discuss later, this maximization assumption may be controversial for the Human Development 
approach. 
9
 This is, of course, a highly stylized representation of the normative and instrumental aspects of applied 
development policymaking. Anyone who ever engaged in practical macro development policymaking knows 
that this picture is far from the reality of the political, interests groups and even interpersonal conflicts 
populating that practice. But also knows that the policymakers engaged in that practice are, in the back of 
their minds, always tributary to one (or to more than one at the same time!) normative and instrumental 
view of the process of development.   
 
10
 Time sub-indices are not shown to save notation. 
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3.2                                                                         
 
3.3                                                                   
 
3.4                                                                                 
 
where   is welfare,   is instantaneous utility,   is consumption,    is the time preference, 
  is income,   is technological progress,    is physical capital,    is health capital 
(measured, for instance, by life expectancy),   is educational capital (measured, for 
instance, by school enrolment),   is investment,   is labor,  δ is the depreciation parameter 
for physical capital,    is the depreciation parameter for human capital, and where the 
model is subject to suitable initial and transversality conditions. While the depreciation 
parameter of physical capital is standard, the depreciation parameter for education and 
health depends on the mortality rate and the burden of disease (since high mortality and 
disease burden rates will deteriorate the stock of health and educational capital more 
quickly), and could also be modeled as a decreasing function of the stock of health capital.  
 
Dynamic properties of this kind of models are well known, and intra and intertemporal 
tradeoffs among the model variables can be precisely quantified. As a central planner 
model, these trade-offs are implicit as shadow prices. Alternatively, if the model is 
interpreted as capturing the dynamics of a decentralized market economy, tradeoffs can 
be seen as relative prices, derived in time from a theory of exchange value based on a 
utilitarian or revealed preference axiomatic.  
 
Policy analysis can be modeled introducing explicitly such variables as government 
expenditure and taxes, and also modeling health and education services as publicly 
subsidized private goods or as public goods. Also, a number of well known methods and 
results from a long tradition of dynamic optimal macro policy analysis relating policy goals 
and tools can be applied to these type models or to linearized versions of them (Kendrick, 
1981; Holly and Hughes-Hallett, 1989). And the impact on growth of different institutional 
arrangements at the government level, such a centralized versus federal systems, can be 
analyzed within the model linking those arrangements to some policy variables or to 
specific parameters (Feld and Schnellenbach, 2009; Hartfield, 2006)  
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A number of additional features characteristic of developing countries such as poverty 
traps, structural imbalances, or the significant role played by natural resources can be 
accommodated within the model.  Poverty traps can be generated using production 
functions with increasing returns to scale; renewable resources can be incorporated as 
fixed factors in the production function, while non renewable resources can be 
represented with depletion equations; and structural imbalances can be modeled using 
multi-sectoral and multi-stage production functions.  
 
The model solution yields growth paths for income, consumption and capital stocks. As an 
aggregate representative agent model, it says nothing about inequality. However, 
postulating some kind of agents' heterogeneity, inequality can be introduced into the 
model in a number of ways, allowing studying the evolution of the distribution of 
consumption, income and assets (Caselli and Ventura, 2000). Also, if the policymaker is 
concerned not only about maximizing growth but also about minimizing inequality, the 
welfare function could be substituted by: 
 
 
3.5                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
where   is an inequality index derived from the distributions of   agents' assets, income or  
consumption: 
 
3.6                                                        and                          
 
 
and where instantaneous utility would be increasing in consumption and decreasing in 
inequality: 
 
3.7                                                            
      and    
    
 
While analytical results for this kind of models may well be difficult or impossible to 
obtain, computational simulations with today's tools may not present a very serious 
challenge for an applied development policymaker (Kendrick, Mercado and Amman, 
2006). 
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3.2 Human Development: an alternative or a complement to the standard approach?   
 
Let’s move now to the realm of a hypothetical applied policymaker trying to engage in 
macro (country) development policy analysis from a human development perspective. 
From her point of view, the standard approach to applied development policymaking 
could be subjected to at least two main critiques. 
 
A first criticism comes out from the fact that, from the Human Development approach, 
health and education, as proxies for sets of capabilities, are not only means to achieve 
human development, but also goals with intrinsic value. And that is not reflected in 
standard models such as the one presented earlier, where health and education are only 
means to make possible higher levels of consumption and income, which for the human 
development perspective are just proxies for the command over resources.  In principle, 
this criticism could be taken care of by adding health ( ) and education ( ) as arguments 
into the intertemporal welfare function: 
 
 
3.8                                                                            
 
 
 
 
While this may well change the trade-offs implicit into the model and complicate the well 
known analytical results for standard models, once again it would not imply difficult 
challenges from computational point of view.11   
 
A second criticism would point straight to the issue of trade-offs, claiming that capabilities 
can’t/shouldn’t be measured/compared. This is a strong statement, and it seems to 
contradict the existence of the HDI and the IHDI. If we assume that capabilities shouldn’t 
be measured, it is clear that there is no point in building an HDI. However, even when it is 
accepted that the HDI could be considered as a quantitative proxy for capabilities, any 
kind of calculus of opportunity costs (tradeoffs) of a given capability or capability set in 
terms of another is sometimes rejected, mostly at the level of moral philosophy 
(Nussbaum, 2000). Finally, it is sometimes claimed that even if capabilities’ and 
functionings’  measurement and trade-offs analyses are meaningful, policy optimization 
                                                          
11
 The model uses a time discount factor in the intertemporal welfare function, something that may be a 
matter of controversy, as in fact it is since the early classic discussion by Ramsey.   
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taking them into account is not from a Human Development point of view. All of which 
comes as a surprise for an applied development policymaker, since measurement is 
explicit in the HDI variables, tradeoffs are implicit in the mathematical construction of the 
HDI as a geometric mean, and some form -explicit or implicit- of policy optimization is at 
the hearth of almost any kind of policy analysis.12  
 
So far the included variables and the mathematical forms of the HDI and the IHDI since 
their inception in the first Human Development Report in 1990, seem to have been mostly 
related to information availability, easiness of communication to a wide audience, and 
some idiosyncratic points of view. However, some formal work that could lead towards a 
more rigorous derivation as well as toward a clearer discussion of the differences and 
analogies with standard welfare and development policy analysis has taken place over the 
years (Basu and Lopez Calva, 2011).  
 
An early effort was made by Sen (1985). His formalization goes from commodities to 
characteristics, from characteristics to functionings, and from functionings to capabilities. 
The first step is to define    as a vector of commodities chosen by person i, and     as the 
entitlement set or constraint for person i, so that      . Next define        as a function 
that transforms commodities into characteristics. Then define               as a personal 
utilization function, a function that converts commodities characteristics into a person’s 
activities or states of being (that is, a person’s functionings   ), given a vector     of 
personal characteristics and societal and environmental circumstances: 
 
 
3.9                                                                         
 
 
From this we obtain the set of functioning vectors feasible for person i: 
 
 
                                                          
12
 When the geometric mean formula was adopted for the HDI in 2010 instead of the previous arithmetic 
mean, it was argued that the geometric mean was an improvement since it allowed for imperfect 
substitution between the components of the HDI (UNDP, 2010).  For a discussion of the tradeoffs in the HDI, 
see Ravallion (2010b) and Zambrano (2011). See also the discussion that took place in 2010 and 2011 in the 
UNDP’s Internet site named “Let’s Talk Human Development” (http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/lets-talk-
hd/). 
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3.10                                                                                   
 
 
where    is the feasible set of utilization functions for person i so that       . We can see 
that a person’s functioning reflects the state of a person, what a person has achieved, 
using the commodities she has access to and choosing a personal utilization function. 
Finally, the capability set    can be defined as the set of potential functionings of a person: 
 
 
3.11                                                                                    
 
 
Thus, the capability set reflects the effective freedom of a person as depending from her 
entitlements (command over resources) and her feasible functionings.  
 
At this point, it is interesting to notice that standard welfare economics and social choice 
theory distinguish between outcomes and opportunities, while the capabilities approach 
seems to make an analogue distinction between realized welfare (functionings) and 
potential or feasible welfare (capabilities). Moreover, the capabilities set could be seen as 
an individual’s choice set or budget set. Pointing and exploiting these seemingly analogous 
traits, Kuklys and Robeyns (2005) explore up to what point the capabilities approach could 
be seen as an extended version of standard modern welfare analysis. 
 
From a standard point of view, the impact of a policy π on individual welfare can be 
formalized as: 
 
3.12                                                             
  
   
 
   
  
   
 
where            is the indirect utility function of person   who has income    and 
faces a price vector  , and where the indirect utility function results from the individual’s 
problem: 
 
3.13                                                                    . 
 
 At the social level, the impact of that policy on overall welfare  is: 
14 
 
 
 
3.14                                                        
  
   
 
   
   
   
  
 
       
 
where  is given by the social welfare function:  
 
 
3.15                                                                  
 
 
An extension of this standard approach could be obtained following some lines of work used 
in consumer theory such as the ones pioneered by Becker (1965) and Atkinson and Stern (1981). 
To do so, Kuklys and Robeyns define a utility function over outcomes  , which are in turn 
function of commodities  , and conditioning it on a vector of conversion factors   
(personal, societal and environmental factors that affect the conversion of available 
resources into outcomes) so that the individual’s problem becomes:13 
 
 
3.16                                                                        
 
and the corresponding indirect utility function: 
 
 
3.17                                                                         
 
 
while the social welfare function and the policy impact on social welfare become: 
 
  
3.18                                                                       
 
                                                          
13
 Kuklys and Robeyns also include the following inputs to the utility function: public goods, rationed goods 
and non-market goods, as well as a “choice” variable to account for the “intrinsic value of choice” 
emphasized by Sen (1997). In order to keep things simple, and since the HDI and IHDI do not include these 
inputs, I will not include them.   
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3.19                                                           
  
   
 
   
  
 
       
 
 
Notice that from an aggregate or country level point of view, and given prices, the welfare 
function 3.18 could be seen as depending on aggregate income  , and also on aggregate 
conversion factors  : 
 
3.20                                                                  
 
To see how close these extensions of the standard welfare approach are to the Human 
Development approach, notice that the outcome function   used in 3.16 and the personal 
utilization functions    defined in 3.9 could be seen as analogous. And notice also that 
conversion factors in 3.20 could be interpreted, for example, as aggregate levels of health 
and education. In so doing, the HDI and IHDI could be seen as particular functional forms 
of the welfare function in 3.20.  
 
An explicit or implicit welfare function is the point of departure and a necessary condition 
to perform almost any kind of optimal development policy analysis. But it is not a 
sufficient condition. What is also needed is an explicit model of the dynamic interactions 
of the structural elements -variables and parameters- generating the time evolution of the 
target variables included in the welfare function.  
 
From a standard point of view this would take us back to the welfare function formulation 
presented earlier in equation 3.18, where aggregate income is substituted by aggregate 
consumption as a proxy for command over resources, and where the policymaker also 
cares about inequality:  
 
 
3.21                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
This would be the intertemporal welfare function for the growth model with health and 
educational capital also presented earlier in equations 3.1-3.4, which would then become 
a model of the dynamic interactions between health, education and consumption 
16 
 
(income), and where health and education are not only means but also goals of 
development.   
 
Alternatively, to perform applied development policy analysis from a Human Development 
point of view, what would be needed is an explicit representation of the dynamic 
interactions between command over resources (income) and functionings (health and 
education). More specifically, a precise quantitative model of the way in which resources 
and functionings are transformed into resources and functionings, and of the way in which 
the application of quantitative policy instruments affects those processes. Quite a difficult 
challenge if it is to be confronted without pricing functionings explicitly or implicitly.14  
 
 
4. Further issues  
 
In section 3 I discussed the standard approach to applied macro development policy 
analysis from a quantitative point of view and what could be extensions toward the 
Human Development approach. In so doing, policy interventions were formalized as 
changes in policy variables (π). Usually, these changes are seen as quantitative changes in 
a policy instrument such as government spending or taxes or another quantitative macro 
variable, oriented towards the determination of intertemporal optimal paths for a number 
of target variables.  
 
Perhaps the Human Development approach is not so much concerned about precise 
quantitative changes in policy instruments, as it is interested in institutional innovations to 
expand and equalize capabilities. If this is the case, the Human Development approach 
should also contend with two significant and newer lines of work -Mechanism Design and 
Evolutionary Games- which are slowly gaining space within the toolbox of the applied 
development policymaker. 
   
                                                          
14
 Notice that in the standard model (equation 3.21 and equations 3.2-3.4), even if health and education 
were interpreted as conversions factors or as functionings, they would be in fact priced. In the central 
planner interpretation of the model, they would have an implicit price (a shadow price) and they would be a 
term in the model’s budget constraint, as can be seen in eq. 3.3 where income can be spent in consumption 
or in investment in health or education. In the decentralized markets version of the model, they would be 
priced explicitly and treated as commodities.  
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While standard policy analysis based on the quantitative fine tuning of given policy 
instruments assumes as given certain institutional frameworks within which to optimize 
social outcomes, the newer methods are oriented to define or redefine the “rules of the 
game” by means of the design of institutions to optimize social welfare.15 In so doing, 
persons are no longer seen as “price takers” that respond to quantitative stimuli decided 
by the policymaker, and come to be understood as agents with private information that 
interact strategically with each other and with the policymaker, anticipating her 
movements. In this way, Mechanism Design Theory (Maskin, 2007) enter the 
policymaker's toolbox, who begins to play the role of an Institutional Engineer bringing 
together insights and methods from Game Theory, Experimental Economics and 
Computational Economics (Roth, 2002).  
 
While Mechanism Design usually assumes given preferences and technologies, 
Evolutionary Game Theory tries to go one step further modeling the co-evolution of 
preferences, technology and institutions and asking, as a policy problem, what institutions 
to choose to induce the development of socially desirable preferences and technologies 
(Bowles, 2006).   
 
The scope and potential of the above mentioned modeling and policy design tools is wide, 
and so far some of the most notorious practical achievements have been made in the 
design of specific markets and in the engineering of complex public auctions. However, its 
widespread application in the field of development may perhaps be a matter of time.  
 
Thus, a good deal of work should be done if the Human Development approach is to 
compete effectively for a space within the applied development policymaker toolbox 
against the standard tools which are already well grounded and the newer instruments 
that are making their way inside it.16 
                                                          
15
 The differentiation between standard versus institution building policies was pioneered by Tinbergen 
(1956). Both types of policies are interested in their quantitative social outcomes. While standard methods 
focus on the fine tuning of given quantitative policy variables, institution building methods focus on 
institutional or mechanism design.  
 
16
 It may be the case that the Human Development approach is not interested in occupying space within the 
applied development policymaker toolbox. Moreover, it may well reject the figure of a benevolent 
policymaker making decisions about development and policy tradeoffs altogether, as it seems to be implicit 
in some formulations stressing that the tradeoffs between capabilities is a matter of social choice where 
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